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Abstract—AI and robot ethics have recently gained a lot of
attention because adaptive machines are increasingly involved
in ethically sensitive scenarios and cause incidents of public
outcry. Much of the debate has been focused on achieving
highest moral standards in handling ethical dilemmas on which
not even humans can agree, which indicates that the wrong
questions are being asked. We suggest to address this ethics
debate strictly through the lens of what behavior seems socially
acceptable, rather than idealistically ethical. Learning such
behavior puts the debate into the very heart of developmental
robotics. This paper poses a roadmap of computational and
experimental questions to address the development of socially
acceptable machines. We emphasize the need for social re-
ward mechanisms and learning architectures that integrate
these while reaching beyond limitations of plain reinforcement-
learning agents. We suggest to use the metaphor of “needs” to
bridge rewards and higher level abstractions such as goals for
both communication and action generation in a social context.
We then suggest a series of experimental questions and possible
platforms and paradigms to guide future research in the area.
I. MOTIVATION
The recent rapid and widespread deployment of AI and
robotic systems across a broad range of application do-
mains has raised considerable ethical concern in both pub-
lic and academic arenas. This concern ranges from fears
about the ethical consequences of creating so-called ‘super-
intelligence’ [1] to anxiety about the ability of autonomous
vehicles to make the ‘right’ moral choice of who to kill in
the conventional ‘trolley problem’ scenario [2]. There is a
good deal of hype in the media about both of these scenar-
ios, despite the fact that actual scientific and technological
progress is very far from achieving either of them. The
error in both cases stems from significantly over estimating
the capabilities of AI and robotic technologies and severely
under estimating the powers of human intelligence [3]. In
the trolley problem scenario, for example, it is assumed that
the autonomous vehicle would be capable of computing the
consequences of all possible driving actions it could take
(steering angle, acceleration, breaking), taking into account
vehicle dynamics, inertia, road friction, and predicted re-
sponses of all the other road users (e.g. pedestrians diving out
of the way, other vehicles on the road), all in a very short
amount of time. If such computations were at all possible
(and it’s not clear that they are), the autonomous vehicle
would then have to compute the moral implications of each
outcome. The human response to such a situation, on the
other hand, would most likely be to simply break and try
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Fig. 1. We propose to address ethical decision making in adaptive robots
solely through the concepts of social norms and social acceptability. A robot
that is to be socially accepted has to abide by social norms. Socialization
and development of such a robot would rely on social feedback signals
that also guide human development, that need to be connected into learning
architectures. At the end of this process should be a machine that implicitly
addresses ethics through the eye of the social context by which it is accepted,
rather than trying to achieve a universal ethical standard that we may never
agree on.
and stop the vehicle. From a practical ethical perspective,
simple breaking to minimize potential impact might be a
better choice than attempting to make a rational choice of
who to kill.
Despite all this hype, there is nevertheless an increasing
requirement for AI and robotic systems to be equipped
with some degree of moral competence. Two factors in
particular appear to be instrumental in this trend: increasing
autonomy and increasing social interaction. There is consid-
erable academic and commercial interest in making AI and
robotic systems increasingly autonomous. As they become
more autonomous in their actions and decision making, the
likelihood is that these actions and decisions will increasingly
carry ethical implications [4]. There is also considerable
academic and commercial interest in developing AI and
robotic systems that are increasingly embedded in social
contexts in which they interact with humans [5]. In many of
these situations, so called ‘natural’ interactions with people
will require at the very least an observance of the social
norms that operate in that context.
Much of the debate about the ethics of AI and robots
center on establishing a commonly agreed approach to ethical
decision making [6]. However, there is currently no agree-
ment even on the overall ethical approach that should be
adopted, whether that be based on a utilitarian, consequen-
tialist or virtue ethics stance. This begs the question of how
it is possible to reach agreement on the ethical competence
of an AI or robotic system if agreement cannot be reached
on the fundamental nature of ethics.
In the context of this lack of agreement on the nature
of ethics, there are many researchers who are taking a
pragmatic approach and building AI and robotic systems
with built-in ethical reasoning. Much work has been done, for
example, in using deontic logics for the formal verification of
moral choices in autonomous systems [7]. These approaches,
however, attempt to engineer ethics into their systems, which
inevitably results in brittle and narrow skills that is not
capable of dealing with the breadth and complexity of social
contexts in which the systems will ultimately need to operate.
Taking inspiration from the development of social and
ethical competence in humans from a very early age, this
paper proposes a developmental learning approach based on
socially acceptable behavior. The paper presents a computa-
tional and experimental roadmap for achieving this.
II. DEVELOPING TO BE SOCIALLY ACCEPTABLE
The ultimate bar for any technology to be embedded
in society is always social acceptance. Not ethics per se
determines that decision. A major factor of social acceptance
is the perceived risk [8] and whether it is acceptable with
respect to the technology’s benefit [9] or necessity [10]. This
includes ethical risks like physical harm to people, such
as discussed over decades for nuclear energy, and today
discussed for lethal accidents with autonomous cars [11],
and also in the generally accepted rules of risk assessment
for machinery, including robots [12].
A. Social Norms
Social acceptance has much more nuance than just deliber-
ation about immediate threats to health and life. Technology
must fit into our daily lives, where it is implicitly subjected
to a plethora of laws, but also social norms and values. It is,
above all, important that intelligent machines obey existing
laws regarding machines in general and specific application
areas. A robot does not, in the first place, have to be “ethical”
in any sense of cognitive or deliberate decision making – it
must be constructed to align with law [13].
Laws, already, are specific to each country. Social norms
are even more diverse and culturally specific. Examples
relevant to robotics include:
 Proxemics [14]: members of different cultures have
different sizes of personal space. Getting too close to
someone can be perceived as invasive or threatening,
but the exact distance is culture-specific.
 Offensive gestures [15]: A gesture that is frequently
used for ordinary communication in one culture can be
profoundly offensive in another culture.
 Backchanneling [16]: Some cultures have norms for
highly active and persistent backchanneling even in
the middle of another person’s sentence, while most
cultures value silent listening and actively discourage
such interruptions.
Social norms are not only highly culture-specific, most of
them are also highly context-sensitive [17]. The social norm
to not interrupt people while they are talking, for example,
permits numerous exceptions based on social context and
roles. One could hope to hard-code all these things into a ma-
chine; the point of this article is not that this is fundamentally
impossible. For that, however, the robot’s decision making
would have to be hard-wired and constrained to explicitly
programmed domains. For an autonomous car it may be
both viable and desirable to hard-code decision making in
compliance with the law [13], specific to driving and driving
only.
How, though, can a machine be ethical and socially ac-
ceptable if its very decision making is constantly changing?
How can change be constrained to only socially acceptable
behavior? Is this even possible when a truly intelligent robot
would be capable enough to step forward into new, not
explicitly programmed domains? Would a household robot
thrown into a football match know to obey the commands
of its teammates, but not the commands of its opponents
[18]? Would a robot know that a gesture used in his intended
market is offensive in another culture?
B. Learning Social Norms from Social Needs
A robot could likely not know all these things. Neither
do humans, but we can learn from mistakes. If decision
making is adaptive and the potential context of a system
is extendable, then also its compliance to social norms has
to be adaptive and extendable. The acquisition of new social
norms is therefore an important goal for robot learning and
AI in general.
While the debate of machine ethics suffers from the fact
that there is no (and never was a) universal agreement
on a code of ethics, the pitch towards social norms is
inherently addressing the direct social context of a system,
and acknowledging the cultural diversity that at least the
perception of morality undoubtedly has [19].
The acquisition of such appropriate behavior is, however,
not solved. In fact, it is largely unclear how an AI could
learn to act appropriately within a social context. Clearly
social norms need to be acquired by feedback from the social
context. Declarative verbal instruction (“You must not ...”) is
one possible form of feedback, but which requires profound
prior knowledge and shared concepts. Expressions of valence
(“Well done!”) need less prior knowledge and seem to
resemble rewards, but are typically given by actual people
in ways that are inconsistent with standard reinforcement
learning models [20], [21]. In fact, it is highly culturally
specific whether such verbal feedback is given at all in every
day situations. In some cultures, breaches of social norms are
rather silently “noticed and frowned upon” [22].
We suggest to take a more fundamental and, in fact, cul-
turally independent pathway for feedback: social interaction
itself. Given a machine a need to socially interact would
imply that its learning directs towards socially conformative
behavior – in the same way the need for battery charge would
discourage an agent to destroy its charger. In this view social
interaction corresponds to a positive reinforcement, whereas
social rejection or temporary loss of social interaction is a
negative reinforcement. Amoral or asocial behavior would
discourage others to interact with the machine. The machine
would therefore be discouraged from interrupting other for
the same basic reason as it would be discouraged from phys-
ically harming others: both would result in the loss of social
interaction. It is known for children that an appeal to negative
social consequences is far more effective in discouraging
negative behavior than non-social appeals [23], with parent
and peer relations being most significant [24]. Hence, putting
valence on social interaction itself, and giving also machines
a need for it appears to us a fruitful way to embed ethics
into adaptive machines, which is now recognized as a key
issue in machine ethics [25].
C. The need for a radically interaction-centered approach
Social interaction capabilities are the prerequisite of ethi-
cal behavior and certainly root in the sensori-motor domain,
but they do not emerge easily from the fully bottom-up
incremental approach. The latter typically gets stuck in rela-
tively simple scenarios and it has remained unclear how the
required more complex behavior control for meta-cognition
may be formed.
We therefore argue for an alternative radically interaction-
oriented approach, which starts from endowing the robot with
very basic interaction skills. These shall be embedded in an
initial hypothesis of a simplified meta-cognition system that
has needs, goals, and ways to explore and react to social
feedback. Similar to the original sensorimotor developmental
approach, where certain basic controllers e.g. to generate
exploratory movement, to recognize blobs, or to detect
motions are assumed, the interaction-oriented developmental
approach that we propose here assume a basic set of capa-
bilities to initiate interaction and to detect social signals.
III. A COMPUTATIONAL ROADMAP
In the tradition of developmental learning, an incremental
approach that first centers on learning of basic sensorimotor
skill is predominant [26], [27]. The great promise of this
approach is to scale to more versatile higher-level cognitive
behavior through increasing the complexity of the system.
This approach is often motivated by through studying the
child development and consequently is practically explored
mostly with child-like humanoid robots like e.g. iCub [28]
or Nao [29]. This approach has lead to a number of advance-
ments in learning and interaction methods [30], [31], [32],
[33] that are successful despite being based only on very
few assumption in a learning-while-behaving approach. It
has, however, not scaled to more complex cognitive behavior
and there is currently no hint that the discussed question of
appropriate or ethical behavior can be tackled in this way.
Enabling the learning of socially appropriate behavior in
a closed loop will require a variety of different mechanisms
(see Fig. 2). In this section we discuss what building blocks
might be necessary and what particular challenges need to
be addressed.
A. Needs and Biases
The root cause for socially appropriate, and eventually
ethical, behavior in this proposed approach is the need for
social interaction. The first challenge is therefore to detect
whether a social interaction is ongoing, and thereby provide
the basis for positive or negative reinforcement. This has
been a focus area in developmental robotics as well as
human-robot interaction research in the past, from which
many possible interaction channels are already known.
A very basic sign of a potentially ongoing social inter-
action is seeing someone’s face. Neonates have well known
attentional biases towards faces [34], and facial recognition
software [35] is readily available nowadays. A socially
learning agent could start by simply regarding the presence
of a face as a reward, and learn and maintain a course
of action that leads to faces showing up repeatedly. A
misbehaving agent might simply not be attended to, and
therefore be deprived of its social stimulus. Similarly, the
detection of human voice is a well known attentional magnet
in infants [36] and readily detectable for machines [37].
Models of cross-modal synchrony [38] can further indicate
how auditory and visual stimuli relate to each other. Being
talked to can be regarded as a sign of social interaction in the
same way as seeing a face. Neither is a strict proof of a social
interaction going on, but each might be already sufficient as
an initial bias towards it. Further, mutual gaze detection is
used as significant cue in human-human social interaction
[39] and generally a strong cue for receiving attention that
has been used also in robotic systems [40].
Passive approaches like face and voice detection are
complemented by models that analyze environmental stimuli
in direct relation to the agent’s own action. Contingency
detection [41] has been argued to be a key factor in detecting
social interactions by focusing on stimuli that are repeatedly
observed right after an agent’s actions. Other models have
focused on longer-term self-other discrimination, and sug-
gested predictive models as a key mechanism [42].
While all these cues could indicate the sheer presence of an
interaction, and therefore by regarded as positive reinforcers,
the valence of the interaction itself might have to be taken
into account. Empathy [43] has been argued to be a key
factor in social development, and could act as a modulator
to the otherwise only positive nature of detecting social
interaction. While someone being happy would indicate a
positive reinforcement, detecting an angry face could be
contribute negatively to the agent’s social need. In each
of these cases the social need would be fed directly from
sensory input (see Fig. 2).
B. Social Reinforcement Learning
The next challenge is how to incorporate such signals
into a learning architecture. Given that we discuss them in
terms of valence (good/bad), standard reinforcement learning
architectures are a possible first approach. Neuroscientific
studies have indeed shown that adaption towards social con-
formity resembles reinforcement learning related signals in
the brain [44]. Work on “social reinforcement learning” [45],
[21], [20] has so far focused on making use of interaction
partners in exactly the same way that a carefully, manually
shaped reward function is used: get accurate feedback about
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Fig. 2. Conceptual view of building blocks and interactions for a socially developing moral machine. The agent (right) interacts with the world (left)
potentially including both social partners and non social objects. A set of social and internal needs motivates behavior through goal abstractions. External
stimuli affect behavior through this need system, including linguistic feedback that is grounded in goal representations. Social bonding and prospection
further ground the social needs through memory.
the immediate action in a repeatable way as often as pos-
sible. This is, in practice, not how people give feedback,
though. People do, for example, not only give feedback about
present and past action, but also “anticipatory rewards” [21]
as promise for future action. Further, people do not keep
positively reinforcing things that are already good [20].
A further key challenge is how to reconcile such social
reward signals with internal/intrinsic needs such as self-
preservation. Both internal and external factors need to be
weighed at any time [18]. Standard reinforcement learning
can only achieve this by combining all different needs or
reward signals into a single number representing the overall
reward, which is typically done by forming a weighted sum
of the different components. Then, the Bellman equation
dictates that rewards are linearly combined over time. Effec-
tively, this allows to trade one need for another: getting a neg-
ative reward for running out of battery could be compensated
by getting a positive reward not colliding with an obstacle.
This is in practice addressed by careful manual reward
shaping, but which does not the remedy the underlying
formal problem. Multi-objective reinforcement learning [46]
can tackle instantaneously conflicting objectives, but leaves
the temporal problem. Even the worst behavior at one point
in time may be compensated with future good behavior. This
averaging is known be inappropriate for many applications
[45], but particularly inadmissible for self-preservation and
ethics. A robot must not be able to “compensate” for
destructing itself or even harming a person.
C. Needs as Proto-Goals
Adaptive agents must overcome this flaw of established
reinforcement learning if they are to behave ethically. Studies
have already shown that this can be achieved for the case
of self-preservation by models of fear [47], [48] that com-
plement regular positive rewards with a disjunct system for
negative rewards that can be used to selectively control risk
aversion. Models of hormonal systems [49] have achieved
to arbitrate more components, but require substantial hand
crafting of the endocrine dynamics. Particularly useful in
these system is the implementation of a numerical “need”
concept that superficially looks like a reward system but has
specific dynamics. In particular, a need can be satisfied to
100%, which clearly signals that the need does not need
to be actively pursued at the moment and other needs
can be given priority. Bare numeric rewards in a classic
reinforcement learning sense do not allow to perform this test
of achievement, which is otherwise only possible for explicit
goal representations [50]. Hence, needs might already be
regarded as “proto-goals” that could quickly lead to more
concrete goals abstractions [51] (see Fig. 2) that could allow
for efficient action planning as well as lay the ground for
communication.
D. Language
The mechanisms discussed so far only concern feedback
about present (or past) experience. If a robot behaves inap-
propriately, it may be able to figure out the mistake and never
repeat it. For self-preservation and ethical purposes this is
not sufficient. In classical reinforcement learning scenarios,
simulated agents need to attempt self-destructive action to
learn that it is self-destructive, such as falling off a cliff
repeatedly in order to learn that cliffs are dangerous. Careful
reward shaping can remedy this to some extent, for example
by giving small negative results in the vicinity of dangerous
states, but even then the robot has to get at least close to
danger to learn about it.
An expensive physical robot cannot be exposed to risk in
this way. Neither could it be allowed to learn about serious
ethical failure only by committing it repeatedly. A robot must
not harm a person, just in order to learn from the social
reaction that harming people is unethical.
This can only be addressed by giving social feedback
about hypothetical action without anyone performing it. This
is achieved amongst humans only by means of language: “Do
not go near the cliff”. “Do not use this offensive gesture”.
Getting a social agent to incorporate such statements into
its system would bring a significant leap towards moral
machines, but is far from trivial in particular for learning
machines that develop their own action repertoire.
For the social development described in this paper it is not,
however, necessary to include the full complexity of speech
and communication at all times. Firstly, we think it is, despite
the overall developmental paradigm, admissible to include
prior knowledge of language. Incorporating prior knowledge
and biases about language would serve the same function
as incorporating prior knowledge about faces or voices: to
enable the eventual social and moral development. Secondly,
it seems sufficient to comprehend key elements of linguistic
feedback without the agent being able to produce speech
itself. Learning to communicate with language is a highly
interesting and relevant research area, but not immediately
necessary for the moral scope. The latter point bares simi-
larity for example with the socialization of intelligent pets,
which may take a set of verbal instructions along with other
social feedback, but do not have to speak themselves.
A specific additional challenge in this domain is that the
agent’s action repertoire is subject to learning. In order to
allow language to refer to the agent’s (hypothetical) actions,
the agent has to have an abstraction of it and know how
to connect it to an utterance of a social interaction partner.
The abstraction aspect can be addressed with approaches for
the learning of goal representations [52], which have been
hypothesized to be necessary in cognitive system exactly for
communicative purposes rather than purely action control
[50]. Mapping the abstraction to a spoken word, however,
does require at least some extent of linguistic learning (even
though other linguistic aspects may be incorporated as prior
knowledge or even omitted).
E. Social Relations
Linguistic feedback about hypothetical action eventually
has to be incorporated into the same system of needs as
any other social signal (Fig. 2). At this point it is not per
se clear what exact valence a statement like “Do not use
this offensive gesture” has. There may be an impending
penalty, which may even be explicitly stated. In the scope of
this paper, the more relevant consequence would be the loss
of social contact after disobedience. Estimating the impact
of that loss, and therefore truly closing the loop back to
needs and resulting actions, would require models of social
relation. Receiving the full impact from a sentence like
“I will be very disappointed with you if you do that” is
only possible if there is a specific sense of relevance of the
relation with the immediate interaction partner. Generally,
receiving commands as well as evaluating feedback for
decision making requires awareness of social role and/or
identity.
A learning agent will need to know or learn whose feed-
back (or commands) to incorporate, and hence give priority
to some social relations over others – it would have to bond.
It would need a memory (see Fig. 2) of the character and
state of such relations, and learn to make predictions about
the future of relations, for example based on the keyword
“disappointed”. Only then could the significance of “I will
be very disappointed with you if you do that” truly be
evaluated. Long term moral development could in these lines
be achieved by cultivating an episodic memory [53] for the
prospection of not only sensomotoric, but also social events.
IV. AN EXPERIMENTAL ROADMAP
A most basic interaction loop still relevant to this area
could be realized in very simple way, e.g. through blinking
LEDs or making noise for gaining attention and by pre-
defined interpretation of positive of negative feedback in
one or more sensory domains (acoustic, visual, touch) or
by interpreting no external reaction as as a kind of negative
feedback. The goal is to shape the initially rudimentary meta-
control systems through learning, where we expect that both
well established approaches from classical developmental
learning e.g. [30], [31], [32], [33] and reinforcement learning
have to be and can be transferred in this domain. We
also expect that various mechanisms of classical association
through conditioning will play a crucial role, where we can
build on advances in dealing with delayed rewards from
the neurorobotics domain [54], [55]. That is, we argue to
adapt and deploy the successful ideas and algorithms of
developmental learning to a higher level, where it is the
meta-cognition skill of context-based skill coordination that
has to be learned rather than the skill basis itself like in
more sensorimotor based approaches. The role of the basic
controllers here is played by socially and interactively mean-
ingful basic interaction skills that in an ideal incremental
approach themselves emerge from lower level learning. Here,
however, they are assumed to be given as the latter appears
more difficult than originally foreseen in the bottom-up
sensorimotor developmental learning approach. This leads to
a high freedom of choice for the robotic platform to be used,
as interaction even with very simple devices can be in this
sense meaningful as long as the have for the interaction part-
ner cognitively and communicatively relevant actuation (e.g.
loudspeakers) and respective sensors to interpret feedback.
The current commercial success of such devices as ECHO
is a striking example for such hardware.
A. Experimental Questions
A number of experimental questions needs to be addressed
in this area. Firstly, what is the simplest actuation/action
system to allow studies of social acceptance in practice?
The blinking LED is the most radical simplification of an
actuation system with just one binary degree of freedom.
Experimentally this would only be fruitful if there would
be a chance for socially “inappropriate” behavior. This is
difficult but not impossible for an LED, which may better
not blink glaringly in the dark while someone is trying to
sleep. Possible escalations in terms of motor complexity are
for example mechanical construction with a single degree
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Fig. 3. A Range of possible platforms for learning of social norms, from simple to complex action capabilities: (a) An LED. (b) Amazon Echo. (c)
Babyface visualization [56]. (d) Keepon [57]. (e) Anki Cozmo. (f) Sony Aibo. (g) Softbank NAO.
of freedom or beeping loudspeakers. Further escalations
could be simple faces or toy-grade robots that elicit social
responses without having too many degrees of freedom that
need to be coordinated.
Such more complex action systems may well be necessary
for experimentation on longer time scales. Apart from asking
which actuation would invoke responses at all, we have to
ask what actuation or design maintains social interaction
after initial curiosity and excitement have faded. An LED
or beeping loudspeaker may not be enough for this, but it is
not clear what is generally required.
The same two questions must be addresses experimentally
for the nature of social feedback signal. It is firstly not
actually clear whether a need for facial stimuli alone would
be enough to effectively shape behavior in a way that is
agreeable to people at all. Secondly, the necessary nature of
the feedback signal may change when it comes to long-term
experimentation after people habituated to the system and
interact differently.
At the end of such experimental runs, the loop to ethics
and social acceptability should be closed. Would people
judge a system as socially acceptable after they have im-
plicitly trained its behavior? Would it depend on whether
they explicitly know that they have trained it? Would they
explicitly characterize the system’s behavior as “moral” or
“ethical”?
An interesting question that could be addressed without
human long-term involvement is the possible formation
of new social norms in groups of robots. Studies on the
emergence of social norms [58] have so far focused on
game theoretic formulations with explicitly un-social and
in fact not communicated payoffs. Adding social interaction
dynamics in the sense of this article could therefore shed
new light also on the formation of our human social norms.
A possible integration point for this scenario are language
emergence studies involving robot “societies” [59], [60].
B. Experimental Paradigms
The proposed approach poses a number of specific experi-
mental challenges, because the learning robot or device must
be embedded in the social context for which it shall learn
the respective appropriate behavior. Controlled laboratory
or wizard-of-oz studies are therefore neither possible nor
reasonable and the respective platform must be deployed in
the wild, for instance in households or offices. Consequently,
it must be extremely robust and simple, self-explicatory and
intuitive to interact with.
It will also be a challenge to keep the interest of the social
partners beyond an initial exploratory phase, where they will
be curious to interact. But long term experiments with robots
deployed for instance in elementary schools have shown
that after the initial curiosity phase, interest may quickly
decline [61]. The commercial success of Tamagotchi devices,
however, shows that a clever design and appeal to the native
tutoring intuitions of humans can motivate a lot of interaction
with such devices. In a similar vein, game-oriented methods
to breed and raise robotic pets have been considered [62],
however, without any emphasis on social and ethical behav-
ior, as the device is rather passive and has no elaborate meta-
cognitive control system. Given this experience, it can be
assumed that a robot or simpler interacting device may create
enough interest to initialize the desired learning and that the
increasingly versatile behavior then initiates a self-sustained
progress and interest. It may, however, be advisable to create
a user community to reinforce their interest, possibly in a
later stage of experimentation.
Two further crucial issues need to be tackled. Evidently,
cross-cultural studies would be highly desirable, where cul-
ture is meant in a rather wide sense of groups with different
social norms. This can be cross-country, but also simply in
different societal groups within a country or even with a sin-
gle organization (e.g. students, teaching staff, administration
within a university). If successful, the progress of learning
should actually be an indicator of cultural differences be-
tween groups.
A further, increasingly difficult problem is of more practi-
cal nature in securing the application of a rigorous research
ethics. As the approach originates in interaction with human
individuals and groups, who will give feedback in various
ways, data protection is of utmost importance. Monitoring
the interaction for research purposes will inevitably include
the recording and evaluation of sensitive information, be it
biometric information or potential behavioral profiles of the
interacting individuals. According to the upcoming EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation far reaching measures way
beyond the obligatory informed consent of the participants.
The research procedures must ensure that participants can
withdraw and have their data erased at any time and that
recording data can be switched off and temporarily disabled
transparently and straightforwardly. Also, occasional inter-
action by visitors, for instance, must not occur unless these
again are fully included in the experimentation as partici-
pants. Finally, we expect that autonomous operation of the
device itself is the only feasible setup, since cloud solutions
with remote computing would only multiply data protection
problems. Still, a systematic evaluation will require some
kind of networked remote access for data accumulation
and diagnosis in case of misfunctions, such that respective
security concerns must be addressed.
In total, a respective experimentation will not be easy to set
up and comes with a large responsibility for the researchers.
However, we believe that it is worthwhile nevertheless be-
cause it may provide through route to a lot more insight how
social behavior forms and can be implemented in artificial
agents.
C. Platforms
Based on the previous discussion, simple platforms are
both necessary for practical purposes of robustness and de-
ployment and sufficient to test our hypothesis that a radically
interaction-oriented learning approach can be feasible and
leads to learning of appropriate behavior. In the extreme,
already a simple diode together with a microphone could
learn when to blink and when not, for e.g. cheering someone
in a group communication. If unreasonable, it would be shut
off temporarily for feedback. That is, we can cut off the
traditional motor complexity of traditional robots and resort
to much simpler designs. Fig. 31 shows a number of such
devices, which however all would have to be equipped with
sufficient computational power to execute the learning archi-
tecture sketched out in the previous sections and with some
simple control board for connecting the different sensory
and active channels. Fortunately, for the latter modern low
cost microcontrollers are available, such that producing a
respective hardware based on a simple off-the-shelf toy-like
1Images (a) public domain, (b) Frmorrison CC-BY-SA-
3.0, (c) IEEE [56], (d) IEEE [63], (e) public domain
https://brandfolder.com/cozmo/public, (f) public domain,
(g) Softbank Robotics Europe CC-BY-SA-4.0.
device or robot together with some home-brewed integration
is not a major hurdle for implementation of the approach.
V. ETHICAL MACHINES?
How ethical can adaptive machines be? We have, in fact,
argued that this may be the wrong question, given that soci-
eties cannot agree on the meaning of “ethical”. What matters,
anyway, is whether actual societies with all their diversity
accept technology, regardless of potential philosophical stan-
dards. Considering the scope of adaptive machines, which
change their decision making while in operation, then brings
up how to learn to be socially acceptable. We have therefore
suggested to consider social interaction itself as a positively
reinforcing stimulus, and give robots social needs. This paper
has outlined key computational and experimental challenges
on the way to such learning capabilities. None of these
challenges is entirely unique to the ethics problem. Ethics
does, however, provide a unique perspective on their role
and significance, and allows re-evaluate, re-prioritize, and
re-think problems related to social interaction, reinforcement
learning, cognitive architecture, and language.
How ethical can adaptive machines be if they are equipped
with social needs? We do not know, but think that at the very
least we would learn substantially about social interaction,
development, and maybe society and ethics itself, by trying
to find out.
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